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The Israel-PLO Interim Agreements:
Are They Treaties?
John Quigley*
Introduction
In the resolution of conflict situations in the late twentieth century, non-
state parties have featured prominently as signatories to agreements. A
non-state party may be an insurgent force contending for power within a
state. It may be a political entity representing a segment of the territory of
a state, seeking autonomy or independence. It may be a movement assert-
ing a right of sovereignty to territory on behalf of a people.
This Article examines the legal character of the agreements between
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel that began in Oslo,
Norway, in 1993. Are these agreements "treaties" that are binding on
either party at the international level? If the PLO is not a state, can these
agreements nonetheless be binding under international law? Is it possible
that the PLO, or perhaps the Palestine it seeks to establish, is actually a
state and that these agreements are between two states and, on that basis,
treaties? This Article explores agreements of non-state parties, and the
murky line between statehood and non-statehood, in an effort to find the
appropriate characterization of the Israel-PLO agreements.
I. Varieties of Non-State Agreements
Agreements by non-state entities may be concluded in a variety of contexts.
One is in the context of a relationship between a state and one of its com-
ponent parts. While the state in such a situation may seek to confine the
relationship to the domestic law plane, the component entity may seek to
internationalize it. For example, consider a 1994 agreement between the
Russian Federation and Tatarstan, a constituent part of the Russian Feder-
ation.1 The Tatarstan authorities sought, by the agreement, to place Tatar-
stan's relation with the Russian Federation on the international plane,
while the Russian Federation authorities sought to confine it to one gov-
* Professor of Law, Ohio State University. LL.B., M.A. 1966, Harvard Law School.
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1. Dogovor Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Respubliki Tatarstan "0 razgranichenii predmetov
vedeniia i vzaimnom delegirovanii polnomochii mezhdu organami gosudarstvennoi vlasti
Rossiishoi Federatsii i organami gosudarstvennoi vlasti Respubliki Tatarstan" [Treaty of the
Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan "On the Delimitation of Competencies
and Mutual Delegation of Powers between the Governmental Organs of the Russian Fed-
eration and the Republic of Tatarstan"], Feb. 15, 1994, reprinted in Ross. GAzETA, Feb.
17, 1994, at 6.
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erned by Russian law. Thus, the agreement defines Tatarstan as a state
entitled to participate in international relations and forbids any such inter-
national agreements that might contravene "the Constitution and interna-
tional obligations of the Russian Federation."2 A linguistic quirk allows
each party to argue its view of the character of the instrument, since the
Russian word used to denominate it, dogovor, means "treaty" in interna-
tional law and "contract" in domestic law.
The same issue besets efforts at an arrangement between Moldova and
Transdnestr, a section of Moldova that seeks independence. Negotiations
conducted to draft a document to define the relationship stalled because
Moldova insists that Transdnestr be characterized as an integral part of
Moldova.3 A draft proposed by Russia would establish a federal system.4
That it would have international guarantors, namely, the governments of
Russia and Ukraine and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, is one important feature of the proposed instrument seemingly
giving it an international character.5
Civil war is another context for agreements between a state and a non-
state entity. A series of agreements concluded between the government of
Guatemala and an opposition movement, called the Guatemalan National
Revolutionary Unity, is a recent example of an agreement arising under
this context. 6
With both the Russia-Tatarstan and the Moldova-Transdnestr arrange-
ments, one party seeks international status. The agreements in Guatemala
involve no such effort; rather, one party sought to replace the other as the
government of Guatemala. The Guatemalan agreements, like the proposed
Moldova-Transdnestr agreement, feature international oversight. For Gua-
temala, the United Nations established an observer mission.7 U.N. observ-
ers were stationed throughout Guatemala to take complaints from anyone
2. Id. preamble, art. II(11). See also Gennady M. Danilenko, The New Russian Con-
stitution and International Law, 88 AM.J. INT'L L. 451, 458 (1994) (noting that the instru-
ment fails to indicate how the two parties are to coordinate their activities in
international relations).
3. President Snegur States His Objections to Draft on Future of Dnestr Region, BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, Aug. 16, 1996, available in NEXIS, News Library.
4. Svetlana Fyodorova, Tiraspol and Kishinev in a State of Cold War, SEGODNYA [Rus-
sian Press Digest], Aug. 10, 1996, at 4, available in NEXIS, News Library.
5. Roman Arkadyev & Boris Talov, Transdniestria Will Be Recognized in the Long
Run, OBSHCHAYA GAZETA, July 5, 1996, at 5, available in NEXIS, News Library.
6. Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca.
7. Letter dated 17January 1994 from the Secretary-General to the President of the
General Assembly and to the President of the Security Council, Annex: Framework
Agreement for the Resumption of the Negotiating Process between the Government of
Guatemala and the UNIDAD Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (Government of
Guatemala and Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca), chap. VI (requesting
U.N. to verify all agreements to be made between them), U.N. Doc. A/49/61, S/1994/53
(1994); Letter dated 8 April 1994 from the Secretary-General to the President of the
General Assembly and to the President of the Security Council: Annex I: Comprehensive
Agreement on Human Rights (Government of Guatemala and Unidad Revolucionaria
Nacional Guatemalteca), chap. X (requesting Secretary-General to organize a mission for
the verification of human rights), U.N. Doc. A/48/928, S/1994/448 (1994), reprinted in
36 1.L.M. 276 (1997).
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claiming that the arrangements for ending the civil war were being violated
and, in particular, that human rights were being infringed.8 International
monitoring protects the non-state party, whose only leverage comes from
its armed opposition to the government. Once that party agrees to negoti-
ate rather than to fight, it loses its leverage and needs the assurance of
outside protection.
An agreement signed in Mozambique in 1974 between Portugal and
the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) is an example of
an agreement where a non-state party not only sought statehood but also
gained it.9 The purposes of that agreement were to end Portugal's colonial
rule in Mozambique and, consequently, to establish FRELIMO as the gov-
ernment of Mozambique. Twenty years later, FRELIMO-ruled Mozambique
in turn signed an agreement with a non-state party, the insurgent group
RENAMO (Mozambican National Resistance), to end a civil war.10 In
South Africa in 1994, the government signed a tripartite agreement with
two non-state entities, the Inkatha Freedom Party and the African National
Congress, to set procedures for elections in the country. 1 This agreement
contemplated a role for the two non-state parties in the governance of the
country.
Thus, agreements between a state and a non-state party are not
unknown in international practice. The character of such agreements will
be examined below. Whether the Israel-PLO agreements fall into this cate-
gory, however, is a matter that requires clarification. If the PLO represents
a state, or if it otherwise qualifies as a subject of international law, then its
agreements can be treaties.
The agreements in question have been concluded between Israel and
the PLO beginning in 1993. The agreements followed a conference held in
Madrid in 1991, hosted by the United States and the Soviet Union. 12 As a
result of that conference, Israel and a Palestinian delegation negotiated in
Washington, D.C.13 In 1993, at a time when it was not clear whether those
negotiations would succeed, the PLO and the Israeli government met in
Oslo at the invitation of the Norwegian foreign minister. The Oslo meet-
ings led to the drafting of a Declaration of Principles, signed in September
1993. The Declaration provided that Israel would withdraw from the Gaza
Strip and from various sectors of the West Bank over a five-year period,
8. Situation in Central America: Procedures for the Establishment of a Firm and
Lasting Peace and Progress in Fashioning a Region of Peace, Freedom, Democracy and
Development, Annex: Fifth Report of the Director of the United Nations Mission for the
Verification of Human Rights and of Compliance with the Commitments of the Compre-
hensive Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala, U.N. Doc. A/50/1006 (1996).
9. Mario Dujisin, Mozambique Elections: A Chronology of Suffering, Inter Press Ser-
vice, Oct. 27, 1994, available in NEXIS, News Library.
10. Id.
11. U.N. Council Welcomes Breakthrough Agreement Between South African Parties,
Xinhua News Agency, Apr. 19, 1994, available in NEXIS, News Library.
12. RAJA SHEHADEH, FROM OCCUPATION TO INTERIM AccoRDs: ISRAEL AND THE PALESTIN-
tAN TERRITORIES 103 (1997).
13. Id. at 105.
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allowing the PLO to administer areas as Israel withdrew. 14 Israel would
withdraw quickly from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank town of Jericho
and later would withdraw "gradually" from additional but undefined por-
tions of the West Bank during the interim period. 15
In a separate document, a letter from PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat to
Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin of Israel, the PLO "recognize[d] the right of
the State of Israel to exist in peace and security," renounced the use of
force against Israel, and declared that provisions of the Palestinian
National Covenant that oppose Israel's right to exist were "inoperative and
no longer valid."'16 In 1994, the two parties signed another document, the
Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, which provided the
terms for the exercise of authority by the parties and led to Israel's actual
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho. 17
The 1994 agreement was superseded by another in 1995, the Interim
Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which foresaw Israeli with-
drawal from all major West Bank towns, with the exception of Hebron,
where Israel would withdraw from most areas but would keep troops to
protect several hundred Israelis who had settled in the center of the town. 18
The 1995 agreement also gave the Palestinians partial control over 450 vil-
lages in the West Bank.19
Under the 1995 agreement, Israel withdrew from the major West Bank
towns except for Hebron.20 Israel delayed its withdrawal from Hebron fol-
lowing bombing incidents in Israel. 21 In 1997, Israel's new government
agreed with the PLO to withdraw from Hebron, and, at the same time,
Israel confirmed that it would comply with the provisions of the 1993 Dec-
laration of Principles.22
Both parties have charged the other with violations in the implementa-
tion of these agreements of 1993, 1995, and 1997. Thus, each considers
14. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, art. 13,
Sept. 13, 1993, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1525 (1993) (agreement between Israel and the
PLO).
15. Id.
16. Letter from Yasser Arafat, Chairman, Palestine Liberation Organization, to Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin (Sept. 9, 1993), reprinted in 7 PALESrNE Y. B. INT'L L. 230 (1992-
94).
17. Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, Cairo, May 4, 1994, reprinted
in 33 I.L.M., 622 (1994), and in 7 PALES-TNE Y.B. INT'l L. 243 (1992-94) (agreement
between Israel and the PLO).
18. Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995, reprinted in
8 PALEsTiNE Y.B. INT'L L. 353 (1994/95) (agreement between Israel and the PLO).
19. Id.
20. SHEHADEH, supra note 12, at 135.
21. Israel Says Delay Likely in Its Hebron Withdrawal, Reuters World Service, Mar. 13,
1996, available in NEXIS, News Library.
22. Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, Jan. 15, 1997, <http://
almachrig.hiof.no/israel/300/320/327/lobran-agreemnt.html> (website at Middle East
Review of Int'l Affairs, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies). See also Mideast Accord;
Looking Ahead: Two U.S. Documents, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 17, 1997, at A12 (giving the text of
a document headed Notes for the Record drafted at the request of Mr. Netanyahu and
Mr. Arafat by a U.S. representative to summarize points agreed to between them).
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the other to be bound, presumably under some body of law, to comply.
After 1993, Israel continued to build housing for its settlers in the West
Bank, particularly in the eastern sector of the city of Jerusalem. The PLO
considered this construction a violation of the 1993 Declaration of Princi-
ples, which provided for eventual talks to resolve the fate of these
settlements.
Israel, in turn, saw violations by the PLO in what it viewed as the
PLO's inadequate efforts to curb acts of violence by Palestinians against
Israeli civilians. Israel also charged the PLO with attempting to conduct
foreign relations in violation of a provision of the 1993 Declaration of Prin-
ciples that gave foreign relations power to Israel in most matters.
A key feature of the 1993 Declaration of Principles postpones resolu-
tion of the major outstanding differences between Israel and the PLO to the
end of the "interim period. '23 These include, in addition to the question of
Israel's settlements, differences relating to refugees from the territories in
question, borders, and the status of Jerusalem. 24 Before qualifying as a
"treaty," an instrument must manifest an intent of the parties to assume
binding obligations, as opposed to being a mere statement of mutual inten-
tions or aspirations. 25 The fact that the Declaration is, in part, an agree-
ment to agree in the future raises a question of whether it is aspirational
only. If so, then it is not a binding instrument regardless of the status of
the PLO.
The 1993 Declaration of Principles has been characterized as "a mix-
ture of various types of legal undertakings," including obligations to take
certain actions immediately upon entry into force of the Declaration, obli-
gations to conclude agreements on certain issues, and obligations to nego-
tiate on certain issues.26
International instruments where the parties agree to negotiate desig-
nated issues in the future are not unknown. Despite the inclusion of provi-
sions about agreeing to agree in the future on key issues, the 1993
Declaration of Principles is sufficiently definite in the obligations imposed
on each party to be a binding instrument. 27
Another matter of form can be raised regarding one of the three agree-
ments. The 1997 agreement was in two parts. The portion providing for
Israel's withdrawal from Hebron was in the normal format of a document
signed by the two parties. 28 However, the portion setting a timetable for
23. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, supra note
14, art. 5.
24. Id.
25. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 1(a), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
26. Antonio Cassese, The Israel-PLO Agreement and Self-Determination, 4 EuRo. J.
INT'L L. 564, 565-66 (1993).
27. Katherine Meighan, Note, The Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles: Prelude to a
Peace?, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 435, 455 (1994) (stating that the Declaration is more than "a
commitment to strive for harmonious relations," and that "[tihe definite provisions of
the Declaration... create an agreement resembling traditional hard law documents in
terms of its substantive content").
28. Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, supra note 22.
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Israel's subsequent partial withdrawals was called "Notes for the Record"
and was written by U.S. negotiator Dennis Ross on the basis of an oral
agreement between Netanyahu and Arafat.2 9
Although treaties are typically instruments purporting to have been
drafted and signed by the parties, this is not the only fashion in which
states may bind themselves. Less formal understandings give rise to treaty
obligations. The Permanent Court of International Justice found that notes
made by one foreign minister of a conversation with another foreign minis-
ter, where a promise was made, gave rise to an international obligation.30
II. The Claim of Palestine to Statehood
One difficulty in analyzing agreements by non-state entities arises as a
result of the indefinite line between a non-state entity and a state. Authori-
ties representing an entity like Tatarstan or Transdnestr may claim that the
entity is a state, under the generally accepted criterion of control over a
population within a territory, coupled with the capacity to engage in inter-
national relations.3 1 The PLO claims statehood for a state called Palestine,
not only in the future, but also at the present time. Its claim, as will be
seen, has received support in the international community. Thus, before
analyzing the PLO's agreements on the premise that the PLO represents a
non-state entity, one must consider the possibility that the PLO represents
a state called Palestine, making an agreement concluded by the PLO with a
state, such as Israel, an agreement between two states.
In the 1970s, the U.N. General Assembly declared that the Palestinian
people had a right to self-determination, and that the PLO was its represen-
tative in effectuating that right.3 2 On this basis, it granted the PLO the
status of an observer at the United Nations.33 The U.N. Security Council
treated the PLO as a state by admitting it to participate in Security Council
sessions when matters of concern to it were being discussed.34 Under
Security Council rules, only a "state" is entitled to participate in such
sessions.35
29. Id.
30. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, 1933 P.C.IJ. 21, 71 (Ser. A/B, no. 53) (where
Norway and Denmark disputed ownership of a sector of Greenland, and Norway's for-
eign minister told Denmark's foreign minister that Norway would "make no difficulties"
for Denmark over Greenland, and Denmark's foreign minister made a note of the
remark, the remark as thus recorded was binding on Norway, precluding it from claim-
ing sovereignty).
31. Inter-American Convention on Rights and Duties of States, art. 1, 49 Stat. 3097,
T.S. No. 8811, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (listing: a permanent population, a defined territory,
government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states); RESTATME NT OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §201 (1987) (listing same items).
32. G.A. Res. 3236, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 at 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974).
33. G.. Res. 3237, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 at 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974).
34. U.N. SCOR, 44th Sess., 2841st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.2841 (1989).
35. Security Council, Provisional Rules of Procedure, Rule 14, U.N. Doc. S/96/Rev.4
(1946).
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In 1988, the Palestine National Council declared statehood for Pales-
tine, claiming the Gaza Strip and West Bank of the Jordan River as its terri-
tory.36 Within a short time, eighty-nine states recognized Palestine as a
state.37 The U.N. General Assembly invited PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat
to address it.3 8 When the United States denied Arafat a visa to come to
U.N. headquarters in New York for this purpose, the General Assembly
took the extraordinary step of moving its session to Geneva so that Arafat
might address it.3 9
In a resolution adopted in Geneva following Arafat's address, the U.N.
General Assembly, with most Western states abstaining, "acknowledg[ed]
the proclamation of the State of Palestine by the Palestine National Council
on 15 November 1988," and decided that "the designation 'Palestine'
should be used in place of the designation 'Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion' in the United Nations system."40 A later draft resolution was pro-
posed that would have construed "Palestine" to mean "state" in U.N.
documents. This draft resolution was not put to a vote, however, after the
United States threatened to withhold payment of its U.N. dues if the resolu-
tion was adopted.4 1
The PLO next applied for membership as a state in the World Health
Organization (WHO), 42 an apparent first step in a PLO plan involving
application for membership in a number of international organizations
and thereby seeking enhancement of international acceptance of its state-
hood.43 This effort generated a threat from the United States, which
informed the WHO that it would withhold its dues to the organization if
Palestine were admitted as a member state.4 4 As a result, the WHO direc-
36. Palestine National Council, Declaration of Independence, Nov. 15, 1988, U.N.
Doc. A/43/827, S/20278, Nov. 18, 1988, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1668 (1988).
37. Paul Lewis, Arabs at U.N. Relax Stand on P.L.O., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1989, at A3.
38. Robert Pear, U.S. Won't Oppose U.N. Geneva Session, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1988,
at A3.
39. Paul Lewis, U.N. Votes to Move Session to Geneva, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1988, at Al.
40. G.A. Res. 43/177, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. (No. 49), at 62, U.N. Doc. A/43/
49 (1989); Paul Lewis, U.N. Ends Its Session in Geneva, Approving 2 Mideast Resolutions,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1988, at A15 (104 voting in the affirmative, Israel and U.S.A. voting
in the negative, and 44 states, including many European states, abstaining).
41. Lewis, supra note 37, at A3; Frederic Kirgis, Admission of 'Palestine' as a Member
of a Specialized Agency and Withholding the Payment of Assessments in Response, 84 AM. J.
INT'L L. 218, 220 n.14 (1990).
42. Constitution of the World Health Organization, July 22, 1946, 14 U.N.T.S. 185,
62 Stat. 2679, T.I.A.S. No. 1808.
43. Jonathan C. Randal, WHO Again Postpones Vote on PLO Admission; Issue Threat-
ens U.S. Funds for U.N. Agency, WAsH. POST, May 11, 1989, at A36.
44. Paul Lewis, U.N. Health Agency Seeks Compromise on P.L.O., N.Y. TIMES, May 7,
1989, at A5; U.S. Warns WHO on Admitting PLO, L.A. TIMEs, May 1, 1989, at Al (state-
ment of State Dept. spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler); Adam Pertman, US Vows Cutoff in
WHO Funds if PLO Joins, BOSTON GLOBE, May 2, 1989, at Al (statement of Secretary of
State James Baker of U.S. to end funding to WHO if Palestine were admitted). See also
Jonathan C. Randal, PLO Defeated in Bid to Join World Health Organization, WASH. POST,
May 13, 1989, at Al (Yasser Arafat, president of the putative Palestine state, called the
U.S. threat to withhold funds "blackmail," as the United States then contributed one
fourth of WHO's budget).
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tor general asked the PLO to withdraw the application.45 The WHO voted
to postpone the application, apparently because of the United States'
pressure.46
That it did not hold territory was a weakness of Palestine's claim to
statehood. When the PLO was sued in a federal court in the United States
for alleged involvement in the killing of a passenger aboard a cruise ship in
the Mediterranean Ocean, it sought to avoid the litigation by asserting that
it was a state and thus immune from suit.4 7 The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit considered the 1988 Declaration of Independence, but
decided that the PLO was not a state because it neither controlled territory
nor had a permanent population.48 Many writers agreed with the Second
Circuit's determination that the PLO, in the period immediately following
its Declaration of Independence, did not satisfy the criteria for
statehood.49
Even without control of territory in the usual sense, however, the PLO
exercised considerable powers in the Gaza Strip and West Bank through its
control of various organizations carrying out quasi-governmental func-
tions. On this basis, it was argued that Palestine was already a state.50
Then, under the 1995 Interim Agreement with Israel, the PLO came to
administer both the Gaza Strip and the major towns of the West Bank. As a
result, it appeared to satisfy the criterion of control of a population in a
territory.
Moreover, the control requirement has been relaxed in international
practice where the putative state was seen to have a right to statehood and
where there was not a competing entity seeking statehood in the same ter-
ritory.51 The Congo, for example, was recognized and was admitted to
45. Norman Kempster, PLO Urged to Drop Bid to U.N. Unit; U.S. Warns It Would
Withhold Money for Health Agency, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 1989, at A9.
46. Randal, supra note 44, at Al. Burton Bollag, U.N. Health Agency Defers P.L.O.
Application to 1990, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1989, at A3 (vote: 83-47). See also Kirgis, supra
note 41, at 218 (the United States was apparently prepared to threaten to withhold dues
from any international organization that might admit Palestine).
47. Klinghoffer v. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et. seq.).
48. Id. at 47-48 (stating that it was insufficient that the PLO anticipated having terri-
tory in the future).
49. Kirgis, supra note 41, at 219 ("It is very doubtful that 'Palestine' currently quali-
fies as a state under international law."); James Crawford, The Creation of the State of
Palestine: Too Much Too Soon?, 1 EURO. J. Irr'L L. 307, 308 (1990) (finding that the PLO
did not satisfy the criterion of control of territory, since Israel was in occupation). See
also id. at 309 (arguing that the PLO's "considerable influence" in the Israeli-occupied
territories fell short of being an "organized self-governing community"); Ruth Lapidoth
& N.K. Colvo-Goller, Les elements constitutifs de l'etat et la declaration du Conseil National
palestinien du 15 Novembre 1988, 96 REVUE Gt-NRALE DE DROIT INTERNAONAL PUBLIC 777,
792-96 (1992).
50. Francis A. Boyle, The Creation of the State of Palestine, 1 EURO.J. INT'L L. 301, 302
(1990); Francis A. Boyle, Create the State of Palestinel, Am.-AR", AFIiaRS, Summer 1988,
at 94 (arguing that this level of control sufficed to consider Palestine a state).
51. M.N. SHAw, INTERNAnoNAL LAw 142 (1991) ("The evolution of self-determina-
tion has affected the standard necessary as far as the actual exercise of authority is
concerned, so that it appears a lower level of effectiveness, at least in decolonisation
Vol. 30
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U.N. membership after being granted independence by Belgium, but before
extending control over the territory of the Congo.5 2 Guinea-Bissau was rec-
ognized and admitted to U.N. membership following Portugal's agreement
to recognize it and to withdraw its forces,53 but before Portugal in fact
withdrew. 54
Palestine arguably has the capacity to enter relations with states,
another requirement for statehood.55 It has been recognized by many
states,56 an indication that other states deemed it an entity capable of
maintaining state-to-state relations. At the time of the signing of the 1993
Declaration of Principles and the PLO's recognition of Israel, Prime Minis-
ter Yitzhak Rabin, on Israel's behalf, recognized the PLO "as the representa-
tive of the Palestinian people."57 Israel demanded that the PLO recognize it
as a state, and the PLO complied; recognition of a state is an act of foreign
relations normally performed by a state.58 Israel's insistence that the PLO
recognize it suggests Israel's acknowledgement that the PLO represents a
state, even though Israel officially maintains the contrary.59
In the 1993 Declaration of Principles, foreign affairs is not one of the
functions listed as being "transferred" from Israel to the PLO. 60 The PLO
agreed that during the interim period it would not exercise foreign affairs
functions, and specifically that it would neither invite foreign states to
establish diplomatic missions in territory it controlled nor establish diplo-
matic missions abroad.61
An entity does not lack the quality of statehood, however, if it agrees to
situations, has been accepted."); JAMEs CRAWroRD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNA-
ioNM. LAW 46 (1979) (requirement of effective control is applied less strictly if no com-
peting entity claims title).
52. CRAwpoRD, supra note 51, at 43.
53. Joint Declaration (Guinea-Bissau, Portugal) signed at Algiers, Aug. 26, 1974,
reprinted in 78 REVUE GtNtRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 1252-53 (1974).
54. G.A. Res. 3205, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1975). See also Lapidoth & Colvo-Goller, supra note 49, at 800 (seeking to distinguish
the Congo and Guinea-Bissau cases on grounds that those two putative states controlled
some territory, whereas PLO controlled none). This factual distinction does not hold
from the time the PLO came into control of Gaza and parts of West Bank.
55. Inter-American Convention on Rights and Duties of States, supra note 31, art. 1;
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 201 (1987).
56. See Lewis, supra note 37. See also Zimbabwe recognises Palestinian passports,
XINHUA NEws AGENcY, Feb. 8, 1996, at A3, available in NEXIS, News Library (identifying
Zimbabwe as one of several states to accept passports the PLO began to issue).
57. Letter from Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to PLO Chairman Arafat, Sept. 9,
1993, reprinted in 7 PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 231 (1992-94).
58. Letter, Yasser Arafat, supra note 16.
59. H. LAuTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONALI LAW 6 (1947) (describing recog-
nition as an act done by states).
60. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, supra note
14, art. 6, para. 2.
61. Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, Cairo, May 4, 1994, art. VI,
para. 2(a), reprinted in 33 I.L.M., 622 (1994), and in 7 PALESTINE Y.B. I'L L. 243 (1992-
94). An identical provision appears in the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and
Gaza Strip (art. IX, para 5). The Interim Agreement superseded the Agreement on the
Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area.
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let another state handle its external relations. 62 For example, Morocco, an
independent state, concluded with France a protectorate treaty whereby
France became responsible for Morocco's foreign relations. Nonetheless,
Morocco was treated as a state.63
The PLO did not cede all foreign relations to Israel. Under the Decla-
ration of Principles and subsequent agreements, the PLO retained the right
to conclude agreements with states and with international organizations
relating to economic matters, and to matters of culture, science, and educa-
tion.64 It is stipulated, however, that such dealings by the PLO with states
and international organizations "shall not be considered foreign rela-
tions."65 This last proviso represented an apparent effort by Israel to limit
the international status of the PLO.
In 1997, the cabinet of the Palestinian Authority discussed the possi-
bility of declaring the establishment of a Palestine state with Jerusalem as
its capital; Chairman Arafat, asserting that Palestine statehood was "not an
Israeli issue" but "an Arab and international issue," indicated that the
intent was to do so prior to the final negotiations with Israel on Palestine's
status. 66 Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu responded that a
"unilateral declaration" of a Palestine state would violate the then recently
signed agreement on Israeli re-deployment from Hebron.67
Whether or not Palestine is a state is not a question for Israel to
decide. That determination turns on objective criteria, with recognition by
states providing significant evidence as to whether these criteria are met.
The answer to this question of fact turns on the role an entity plays in the
international community. Applying these criteria, Palestine has a plausible
claim to statehood because it controls territory and has the capacity to
engage in international relations.
III. Statehood in Territory Under Belligerent Occupation
An additional factor in the PLO's situation may make the arguments over
the criteria for statehood less than central. The PLO's claim to statehood is
affected by the peculiar status of the territories of the Gaza Strip and West
62. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIDED WORLD 78 (1986); CRAWFORD,
supra note 51, at 53-54.
63. Oliver Lissitzyn, Territorial Entities Other Than States in the Law of Treaties, 125
REcuEIL DES couas 5, 53 (1983-il); Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of the United
States of America in Morocco (France v. U.S.A.), 1952 I.CJ. 176, 185, 188, 193-94
(1992).
64. Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, May 4, 1994, supra note 17,
art. VI, para. 2(b); Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995,
supra note 18, art. IX, para. 5(b).
65. Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, supra note 17, art. VI, para.
2(c); Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, supra note 18, art. IX, para.
5(c).
66. Arafat's Cabinet Discusses Establishment of State, Reuters North American Wire,
Jan. 24, 1997, available in NEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
67. Netanyahu Reiterates "Self-Rule and Not a State"for Palestinians, BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, Jan. 25, 1997, available in NEXIS, News Library (from Jerusalem
Israel Television Channel 1 Network in Hebrew 1700 gmt, Jan. 23, 1997).
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Bank. A state that occupies territory during hostilities, like Israel's occupa-
tion of Gaza and the West Bank, holds that territory under a legal regime
called "belligerent occupation."68 This legal regime recognizes the occu-
pant's control but limits the occupant to temporary possession pending a
peace treaty.69 The state that is sovereign at the commencement of the
occupation retains that sovereignty even though it exercises no control on
the ground. 70 Israel acknowledges that its status in the West Bank and
Gaza is that of a belligerent occupant, despite its conclusion of agreements
with the PLO that cede part of Israel's control. 71
The state holding sovereignty normally is deemed by the international
community as continuing to exist, and its government is deemed to repre-
sent it.72 Thus, when Iraq occupied Kuwait in 1990 and purported to
incorporate it into Iraq, Kuwait remained a state,7 3 and the international
community continued to recognize it as such and to recognize the terri-
tory's government as the government of Kuwait, 74 despite the fact that the
government of Kuwait did not control Kuwait's territory. 75
68. See generally GERHARD VON GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY (1957).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Joel Singer, The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrange-
ments, 1 JUSTIcE 4, 6 (pub'd by International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists
1994) (explaining that the West Bank and Gaza Strip remain under belligerent occupa-
tion during the interim period contemplated by the 1993 Declaration of Principles:
"[N]otwithstanding the transfer of a large portion of the powers and responsibilities
currently exercised by Israel to Palestinian hands, the status of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip will not be changed during the interim period."). The author was Legal Adviser to
the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For a view that status of belligerent occupation
continued, see also G.A. Res. 50/29B, Feb. 5, 1996 ("reaffirm[ing] that the Geneva Con-
vention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,
is applicable to the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, .... "). See also
John Quigley, The Israel-PLO Agreements versus the Geneva Civilians Convention, 7 PALEs-
TINE Y.B. INT'L L. 45, 61 (1992-94) (interim agreements do not end status of belligerent
occupation).
72. RESTATEmENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 201, Comment b ("An entity does not
necessarily cease to be a state even if all of its territory has been occupied by a foreign
power or if it has otherwise lost control of its territory temporarily."); VON GLAHN, supra
note 68, at 31-37; MORRIS GREENsPAN, THE MODERN LAw OF LAND WARF'aRE 217 (1959)
("The legal (dejure) sovereignty still remains vested where it was before the territory was
occupied, although obviously the legal sovereign is unable to exercise his ruling powers
in the occupied territory."); Crawford, supra note 51, at 59 (belligerent occupation does
not negate statehood).
73. Louis HENIN Er AL., INTERNATIONAL LAw: CAsES AND MATERI.LS 247 (1993)
("Kuwait remained a state notwithstanding its occupation and putative annexation by
Iraq in 1990").
74. S.C. Res. 662, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/662 (1990), reprinted in
29 I.L.M. 1327 (1990) ("decides that annexation of Kuwait by Iraq under any form and
whatever pretext has no legal validity, and is considered null and void;.., demands that
Iraq rescind its actions purporting to annex Kuwait").
75. EYAL BENvENISTi, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 151 (1993) (stating
that S.C. declaration of the illegality of Iraq's annexation of Kuwait "reaffirmed the basic
tenet of the law of occupation, the inalienability of sovereignty through the use of
force").
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Applying the analysis to the Gaza Strip and West Bank is more com-
plex, since sovereignty over these two areas was not clear at the commence-
ment of Israel's occupation. Egypt had held the Gaza Strip since 1948 but
had not incorporated it into Egypt and did not claim sovereignty. Egypt
considered Gaza to be part of Palestine.7 6 Egypt was holding the territory
pending the emergence of a Palestine state. 77
The West Bank had been held by Jordan since 1948. Jordan had incor-
porated the West Bank into itself, claiming sovereignty, but doing so sub-
ject to the future emergence of a Palestine state.78 Thus, from 1950, Jordan
deemed itself a provisional sovereign. 79 In 1988, after the Palestine
National Council declared statehood for Palestine, Jordan renounced its
sovereignty claim in the West Bank in favor of Palestine's claim.80
There is no reason why sovereignty in occupied territory might not
change during the period of occupation. If, for example, a state whose
territory was occupied decided to merge with another state (not the occu-
pant), there is no reason it could not so merge. Regarding the Gaza Strip
and the West Bank, there was not so much a change in sovereignty, how-
ever, as a clarification of sovereignty, since Egypt never claimed sover-
eignty, and Jordan did so only provisionally.
Israel disputes the conclusion that the PLO holds sovereignty in the
West Bank and Gaza during the interim period, even though Israel does
not claim sovereignty for itself. It takes the position that because belliger-
ent occupation continues, the PLO cannot hold sovereignty. It says that,
given belligerent occupancy,
the Palestinian Council will not be independent or sovereign in nature, but
rather will be legally subordinate to the authority of the military govern-
ment. In other words, operating within Israel, the military government will
continue to be the source of authority for the Palestinian Council and the
powers and responsibilities exercised by it in the West Bank and Gaza
76. Carol Farhi, On the Legal Status of the Gaza Strip, in 1 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN
THE TERRITORIES ADmiNiSTERED BY ISRAEL 1967-1980, at 61, 75 (1982).
77. Republican Decree Announcing Constitutional System of Gaza Sector, Mar. 9, 1962,
art. 1, 17 MIDDLE EAST J. 156 (1963) (1962 constitution adopted for Gaza by Egypt in
1962 stated: "The Gaza Strip is an indivisible part of the land of Palestine."). See also id.
art. 73 ("This constitution shall continue to be observed in the Gaza Strip until a perma-
nent constitution for the state of Palestine is issued.").
78. Albion Ross, Amman Parliament Vote Unites Arab Palestine and Transjordan, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 25, 1950, at Al (Jordan's parliament specifying that by incorporating the
West Bank into Jordan, it acted "without prejudicing the final settlement of Palestine's
just case within the sphere of national aspirations, inter-Arab co-operation and interna-
tional justice").
79. G. Feuer, Les Accords Passds par les Gouvernements Jordanien et Libanais Avec les
Organisations Palestiniennes (1968-1970), 16 ANNuAIRE FRAN(A1S DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
177, 189 (1970) ("One might thus conclude, it seems, that the Palestinians are only
provisionally placed under Jordanian sovereignty.") (translation by Author) (emphasis
added).
80. John Kifner, Hussein Surrenders Claims on West Bank to the P.L.O., N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 1988, at Al; Excerpts from Hussein's address on abandoning claims to the West
Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1988, at A4 ("The independent Palestinian state will be estab-
lished on the occupied Palestinian land after its liberation.").
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Strip.81
This conclusion confuses control and sovereignty. Israel continues to exer-
cise control to the extent determined in the interim agreements, but control
is a matter separate from sovereignty. With belligerent occupation, there is
always a separation of control and sovereignty.
With the Palestine National Council's declaration in 1988, coupled
with the prior recognition of the PLO as the representative of the Palestin-
ian people, the newly declared Palestine state had a strong claim to being
the sovereign of the territory, despite its lack of physical control. Israel as
belligerent occupant had no claim to sovereignty and had not asserted one,
Egypt had never made a sovereignty claim to the Gaza Strip, and Jordan
had renounced its sovereignty claim to the West Bank. In these circum-
stances, it is not surprising that a large number of states quickly recog-
nized the newly declared Palestine state, despite its lack of physical control
over territory.82
Given that Israel is an occupant only, Palestine is sovereign in the
Gaza Strip and West Bank.8 3 Thus, Palestine is a state, and its agreements
with Israel are agreements between two states.
IV. Recognition of Palestine
Recognition of a putative state by other states serves an evidentiary func-
tion. It is normally taken as indicating that other states find that the puta-
tive state satisfies the criteria for statehood.84 In Palestine's case,
recognition may indicate this, or it may indicate that the other states find it
to be the lawful possessor of sovereignty of the occupied territory, regard-
less of whether it exercises control, and that it is a state on that basis,
rather than on the more typical basis of control.
Most European states declined to recognize Palestine following the
Declaration of Independence; some declined on the grounds that they
wanted a more definite indication of Palestine's positive attitude towards
Israel, such as an explicit act of recognition of Israel.
85
The U.N. reaction to the declaration of Palestine independence can be
contrasted to that body's reaction in another case, five years earlier, of a
declaration of independence. In 1983, statehood was declared for a Turk-
ish Republic of Northern Cyprus.86 The international community found
81. Singer, supra note 71, at 6.
82. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
83. Eugene Cotran, Some Legal Aspects of the Declaration of Principles: A Palestinian
View, in THE ARAB-IsRAELI AccoRDs: LEGAL PEaspEcTvas 67, 73 (E. Cotran & E. Mallat
eds., 1996).
84. CASSESE, supra note 62, at 79 ("[T]he attitude of single States acquires considera-
ble weight as evidence for or against the existence of new-legal subjects.").
85. Maurice Flory, La Naissance d'un Etat Palestinien, 93 RvuE GtNtRALE DE DROlT
INTERNAMoNAL PUBLIC 385, 401 (quoting President Francois Mitterand of France: "Many
European countries are not ready to recognize a Palestine state. Others think that
between recognition and non-recognition there are significant degrees; I am among
these.").
86. CASSESE, supra note 62, at 80 (declaration of Nov. 15, 1983).
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this declaration invalid on the grounds that Turkey had occupied this terri-
tory militarily and that the putative state was its creation. The U.N. Secur-
ity Council pronounced the independence declaration illegal.87 Thus, if
the international community finds a declaration of statehood to violate the
rights of an existing state, it may well say so. Had there been concern that
the Palestine Declaration of Independence violated the rights of Egypt, Jor-
dan, or Israel, the Security Council might have condemned the declaration,
as it did that of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
V. Agreements by Non-State Subjects of International Law
If Palestine is a state, and if the PLO, as representative of that state, con-
cludes an agreement that in other respects qualifies as a treaty, it is a
treaty. However, while treaties are normally concluded between states,
states are not the only potential participants. The Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, a widely ratified instrument that regulates treaties con-
cluded between and among states, recognizes the validity of treaties con-
cluded by "other subjects of international law," i.e., subjects of
international law that are not states.88
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not identify such
"other subjects of international law," leaving that matter to customary law.
One example of such subjects is international organizations.89 A separate
treaty has in fact been concluded to regulate treaties involving interna-
tional organizations as participants. 90
VI. Agreements of Mandate Territories
One other category of subjects of international law is an organization that
aspires to establish a state on behalf of a people. During the League of
Nations period, the concept of a "people" was formalized through a system
whereby certain states, acting in a trustee capacity, administered the terri-
tory of a "people." The League's Covenant forbade states that had occupied
territories during World War I to hold them as colonies.91 A state that had
87. S.C. Res. 541, U.N. SCOR, 38th Sess., Res. & Decs. 15, U.N. Doc. S/INF/39
(1983) ("[c]oncerned at the declaration by the Turkish Cypriot authorities issued on 15
November 1983 which purports to create an independent State in northern Cyprus,....
[c]onsidering ... that the attempt to create a 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' is
invalid.... [clonsiders the declaration referred to above as legally invalid and calls for
its withdrawal"). See also CAssEsE, supra note 62, at 80.
88. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 3, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 ("The fact
that the present Convention does not apply to international agreements concluded
between States and other subjects of international law or between such other subjects of
international law ... shall not affect ... the legal force of such agreements.").
89. South West Africa Case (preliminary objections), 1962 I.CJ. 330 (finding the
League of Nations mandate over South West Africa to be a treaty between the U.K. and
the League of Nations: "The Mandate, in fact and in law, is an international agreement
having the character of a treaty or convention").
90. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International
Organizations or Between International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, U.N. Doc.A/
CONF.129/15 (1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 543 (1986).
91. LEAGUE OF NAxiONS CovENaNr art. 22.
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occupied a colonial territory whose people were "not yet able to stand by
themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world" was
obliged to promote the "well-being and development of such peoples."92
The administering state was given, a mandate by the League to carry out
this task.
The League designated a state to administer each mandate territory,
and any claim to sovereignty by such a state was precluded.93 The man-
date system was premised on "a rejection of the notion of annexation."94
An administering power was "not there by any right of possession, but
instead acted as a Mandatory with specifically delegated powers. 95
One of the League's mandates was for Palestine. Great Britain occu-
pied Palestine, then under the Ottoman Empire, during the First World
War. The League gave Britain a mandate to administer Palestine.9 6 The
Palestine that the PLO claims to represent today traces its statehood to the
Palestine of the mandate period.9 7 The 1988 Palestine Declaration of Inde-
pendence states that the international community, in Article 22 of the Cov-
enant of the League of Nations, recognized the right of the Palestinian
people to independence. 98
This assertion is not without foundation. Sovereignty in mandate ter-
ritories resided in the community of persons being administered, which
enjoyed an international status. "Communities under mandate," said the
Institute of International Law in 1931, were "subjects of international law"
since they held "a patrimony distinct from that of the Mandatory State."99
They could acquire rights and could be held to their obligations. 10 0 Pales-
92. Id.
93. International Status of South-West Africa (Advisory Opinion), 1950 I.CJ. 131.
See also DUNCAN HALL, MANDATES, DEPENDENciEs, AND TRUsTmsHIPs 81 (1948) (stating
that the Permanent Mandates Commission, which monitored compliance by administer-
ing powers, "consistently challenged on every possible occasion any policy or legal text
that seemed to imply directly or indirectly that the mandatory state possessed or could
possess sovereignty.").
94. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
1971 I.CJ. 1, 30 para. 50.
95. AARON MARGALITH, THE INTERNAnoNAL MANDATES 46 (1930).
96. Mandate for Palestine, Permanent Mandates Commission no. 466, League of
Nations Doc. C.529.M.314.1922.Vl and C.667.M.396.1922.VI, 8 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J.
1007 (1922), reprinted in Terms of League of Nations Mandates: Republished by the United
Nations, U.N. Doc. A/70 (1946), and also in Convention between the United States and
Great Britain Concerning Palestine, Dec. 3, 1924, 44 Stat. 2184.
97. But see Shabtai Rosenne, IsraEl et les Traitds Internationaux de la Palestine, 77
JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL (Clunet) 1140, 1143-45 (1950) (indicating that Israel
did not deem itself to be a successor state to Palestine and did not deem itself bound by
Palestine's treaties).
98. Palestine National Council, Declaration of Independence, supra note 36,
preamble.
99. James Brown Scott, The Two Institutes of International Law, 26 Am. J. INT'L L. 87,
91 (1932) (giving text of Institute's resolution on mandates).
100. Id. at 91.
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tine had its own citizenship during the mandate period. 10 1 Palestine under
Britain's mandate was considered a subject of international law capable of
treaty relations, despite the control exercised by Britain as the administer-
ing power.1 02
In a clause similar to that in the agreement between Israel and the
PLO, 103 the mandate instrument concluded between Britain and the
League of Nations for Palestine provided that "the Mandatory [Britain]
shall be entrusted with the control of the foreign relations of Palestine. 104
Unlike the agreement between Israel and the PLO, however, the mandate
instrument did not specify that Palestine itself has the power to conclude
treaties on specific topics. Despite that omission, Palestine became a party
in its own name to treaties on a variety of topics.' 05 This practice was not
unique to Palestine. Other mandate territories concluded treaties in their
own name.'
0 6
Palestine under the mandate adhered to a number of multilateral trea-
ties.107 One, for example, was the International Agreement for the Estab-
lishment of an International Bureau of Intelligence on Locusts, concluded
in 1926 by Palestine, Transjordania, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria. The text
referred to the parties as "contracting ... states."10 8
Palestine under mandate concluded bilateral treaties with regional and
European states, including extradition and trade treaties with Egypt,10 9
and treaties on postal services with France,110 Greece,"' Italy," 2 Switzer-
101. Norman Bentwich, Nationality in Mandated Territories Detached from Turkey, 7
Brar. Y.B. INT'L L. 97, 102 (1926).
102. The mandate instrument, to be sure, also provided that Great Britain should
provide for a Jewish "national home" in Palestine. Mandate for Palestine, supra note 96,
art. 2. Ambiguous authorization might have meant that there was more than one "com-
munity of persons" in Palestine enjoying international subjectivity. If that is the proper
interpretation, it would mean that a "community of persons" constituting those other
than Jews was one subject of international law, while the Jews constituted another.
103. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
104. Mandate for Palestine, supra note 96, art. 12.
105. J.L., The International Status of Palestine, 90JouRNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 964
(1963). Britain also concluded treaties for Palestine.
106. Lissitzyn, supra note 63, at 55-56 (indicating that treaties were concluded more
by "Class A" mandate territories, of which Palestine was one, than by "Class B" and
"Class C" mandate territories. "Class A" mandate territories were deemed closer to
being ready for independence than "Class B" or "Class C" mandate territories).
107. 138 L.N.T.S. 149 (taxation, Mar. 30, 1931); 109 L.N.T.S. 121 (health, May 20,
1926); 1 L.N.T.S. 59 (patents/copyrights, June 30, 1920); 1 L.N.T.S. 83 (legal proce-
dures, March 18, 1904); 9 L.N.T.S. 415 (status of women March 31, 1922); 7 L.N.T.S. 35
and 7 L.N.T.S. 65 (water transport, April 20, 1921); 186 L.N.T.S. 301 (mass media, Sept.
23, 1936).
108. Agreement concerning the Creation of an International Office for Information
regarding Locusts, May 20, 1926, art. 2, 109 L.N.T.S. 121.
109. Provisional Agreement with regard to the Extradition of Fugitive Offenders
(Egypt-Palestine), Aug. 7, 1922, 36 L.N.T.S. 343; Exchange of Notes constituting a Provi-
sional Commercial Agreement, June 6 & 21, 1928 (Egypt-Palestine), 80 L.N.T.S. 277.
110. 172 L.N.T.S. 17 (treaty of June 19, 1936).
111. 170 L.N.T.S. 145 (treaty of March 28, 1936).
112. 139 L.N.T.S. 59 (treaty of Dec. 16, 1931).
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land,1 13 and Great Britain. 114 These bilateral treaties were registered with
the League of Nations and published in its treaty series. 115 Palestine's trea-
ties were also applied as law in the courts of Palestine when relevant. 116
VII. Agreements of National Liberation Movements
The United Nations took the concept that communities under mandate
were subjects of international law and expanded it to any people deprived
of a territory to which it has a legitimate claim. This concept was reflected
in a resolution of the U.N. General Assembly stating that "all peoples have
an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty
and the integrity of their national territory," and, on that basis, colonial
powers are prohibited from using force to prevent a people from establish-
ing its independence.1 17
In the era of the United Nations, certain organizations representing
peoples entitled to self-determination have become subjects of interna-
tional law.118 It has been reasoned that such organizations, sometimes
called national liberation movements, represent a people that enjoy an
internationally guaranteed right to self-determination.' 19 Such a move-
ment need not necessarily control territory in order to be deemed a subject
of international law. 120
National liberation movements have made agreements with states
under circumstances suggesting that the state understood it was con-
tracting with another subject of international law. 121 Often, such agree-
ments, like that between Israel and the PLO, have been made to terminate a
military conflict. 122
113. 95 L.N.T.S. 395 (treaty of May 15, 1929).
114. 13 L.N.T.S. 9 (treaty of Jan. 23, 1922).
115. See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text. See also 1950(2) Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM. 209-10 (report by Israel, Iinistry for Foreign Affairs, lists treaties to which Pales-
tine was a party).
116. Shehadeh v. Commissioner of Prisons, Jerusalem, Palestine Supreme Court, Oct.
31, 1947, reprinted in 14 ANN. DIG. & REP. OF PUB. INT'L L. CAsES 42 (1951) (applying a
1921 extradition treaty, apparently not registered with League of Nations, between Pales-
tine and Syria-Lebanon).
117. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. (No. 15), at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961);
see also Lissitzyn, supra note 63, at 66-71, 78-81 (treaties have been made in their own
name by certain colonies, including India, the Philippines, and Southern Rhodesia,
prior to attaining independence.).
118. H. WILSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY NATIONAL LIBERATION
MOVEMENTS 117-23 (1988).
119. CAsSESE, supra note 62, at 91 ("[National liberation movements] are given inter-
national status on account of their political goals: their struggle to free themselves from
colonial domination, a racist regime or alien occupation.").
120. Id. at 91.
121. Julio A. Barberis, Nouvelles Questions Concernant la PersonnalitdJuridique Interna-
tionale, 179 RECUEIL DES COURS 145, 259-64 (1983-1).
122. Eyal Benvenisti, The Israel-Palestinian Declaration of Principles: A Framework for
Future Settlement, 4 EURO. J. INT'L L. 542, 545 (1993); Barberis, supra note 121, at 260-
61.
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The Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), which was declared
by the POLISARIO movement in the territory of the former Spanish Sahara
(now Western Sahara), was granted membership as a state by the Organiza-
tion of African Unity, even though it did not control territory.12 3
POLISARIO concluded a peace agreement with Mauritania in 1979 that
provided for Mauritania's withdrawal from, and renunciation of a claim to,
territory claimed by POLISARIO as forming part of Western Sahara. 124
In humanitarian law, a movement representing a people is deemed to
have the capacity to bring international norms on warfare into effect in a
military conflict in which the movement may be involved. Thus, Protocol I
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, a treaty that
prescribes rules for the conduct of warfare between states, provides for the
possibility of accession to the treaty by "the authority representing a people
engaged against a High Contracting Party in an armed conflict."125 Under
Protocol I, such an authority may file a declaration to abide by the Protocol
and the four Geneva conventions of 1949 on warfare. 12 6 The four conven-
tions and Protocol I thereby immediately come into force as between the
authority and any state against which it is fighting. 127 Hence, a national
liberation movement is in a treaty relationship.
It has been suggested that even if an organization representing a peo-
ple entitled to self-determination is a subject of international law, agree-
ments concluded by such an organization are not international
agreements, since "partial and limited subjects of international law logi-
cally have only partial capacity under that law."'128 An agreement con-
cluded by such an organization may encounter difficulty, to be sure,
because of a non-state's incapacity to resort to international mechanisms
available to a state to secure compliance by an errant treaty partner. But
this practical incapacity does not detract from the international character
of the agreement. The agreement can still properly be called a "treaty" and
be governed by international law.12 9 Indeed, even territories in a colonial
status have been party to instruments that were clearly treaties, as, for
example, was India prior to its independence from Britain. 13 0
123. Edward Schumacher, Saharan Rebels Win a Diplomatic Victory, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
18, 1984, at D5 (OAU recognized SADR and admitted it to OAU membership).
124. Peace Agreement, reprinted in Special Committee on Decolonization, U.N.
GAOR, 34th Sess., 1161st mtg., at 61, U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/PV.1161 (1979). See also
BENVENISTI, supra note 75, at 152; Robert T. Vance, Jr., Recognition as an Affirmative Step
in the Decolonization Process: The Case of Western Sahara, 7 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORDER
45, 62 (1980-81).
125. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I), art. 96(3),
1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Yehuda Z. Blum, From Camp David to Oslo, 28 ISRAEL L. REV. 211, 213 (1994).
129. CASSESE, supra note 62, at 97 ("Organized peoples have the power to enter into
agreements with States and international organizations. Such agreements are regulated
by the international law governing treaties proper.").
130. Kellogg-Briand Pact, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
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VIII. Agreements by Authorities of Occupied Territory
The PLO, in making agreements with Israel relating to the Gaza Strip and
West Bank, enjoys international subjectivity in one other way. If a state or
other authority representing the population of a territory under belligerent
occupation makes an agreement with the occupying power, such an agree-
ment is subjected under international law to a particular regime. The
Geneva Civilians Convention addresses such agreements. Its Article 47
reads:
Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any
case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention
by any change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into
the institutions or government of the said territory, nor by any agreement
concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying
Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the occu-
pied territory. 13 1
Thus, the population of occupied territory is given protection against an
occupant that may be able to extract from the authorities representing the
population a regime more favorable to the occupant than is provided by the
Geneva Civilians Convention. 13 2 The agreements between Israel and the
PLO are of the same type contemplated by Article 47, since Israel is an
occupying power and the PLO represents the occupied population.
Under Article 47, an agreement between the occupying power and the
authorities representing the occupied population is not governed by the
domestic law of either party. Instead, such an agreement is governed by
limitations binding on both parties under international law.' 33 Thus,
whether or not the authorities in question constitute a state, the Geneva
Civilians Convention recognizes in them a capacity to conclude agreements
that are binding under international law.
IX. Other Agreements of the PLO
The PLO's agreements with Israel are not its first. The PLO has concluded
a number of agreements that arguably are treaties. In 1969, it concluded
an agreement with Lebanon and, in 1970, another with Jordan, both relat-
ing to PLO armed forces in the territory of those states. 13 4 These agree-
ments were considered to be binding on both parties and to bear an
131. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 47,
August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (1950) (emphasis added).
132. See COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CMLIAN
PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 275 (J. Pictet ed. 1958) (explaining the historical background
for art. 47 and stating that "cases have in fact occurred where the authorities of an
occupied territory have, under pressure from the Occupying Power, refused to accept
supervision by a Protecting Power, banned the activities of humanitarian organizations
and tolerated the forcible enlistment or deportation of protected persons by the occupy-
ing authorities").
133. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra
note 131, art. 47.
134. Barberis, supra note 121, at 261-64; Feuer, supra note 79, at 177.
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international character. 135 Lebanon and Jordan recognized the PLO's right
to engage in military action against Israel to effectuate the Palestinian peo-
ple's right to self-determination and thus appeared to treat the PLO as a
subject of international law.' 36
The PLO has concluded agreements with a number of international
organizations, including the United Nations Development Programme, the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
East (UNRWA), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), and the International Labor Organization. 13 7
X. Status of the PLO As Reflected in the Israel-PLO Agreements
As for the Declaration of Principles, information relevant to its character
can be gleaned from its text. First, Israel deemed itself to be contracting
with the PLO not simply as that organization, but as the representative of a
people. The preamble refers to the "PLO team" and the "Palestinian Delega-
tion" as "representing the Palestinian people."138 Thus, Israel evidenced an
understanding that it was contracting with the representative of a commu-
nity of people, a representative that, moreover, has been recognized by the
international community as fulfilling that role.139 Israel seems, thereby, to
acknowledge that it is dealing with a party that has status in the interna-
tional community sufficient to make an agreement binding on an entire
nation of people.
A "people," at least a people that has a territory that is not under the
sovereignty of a state, has a right to statehood in that territory if it so
elects. 140 Israel's recognition in the Declaration of the PLO as representa-
tive of the Palestinian people reflects a view that the Palestinian people, as
represented by the PLO, have a right to determine their political status. 141
Thus, Israel again appears to understand that it is contracting with a party
that is a subject of international law.
135. Flory, supra note 85, at 390.
136. Feuer, supra note 79, at 187-88 ("inasmuch as the relations between the state
[Lebanon] and the organizations involve a certain element of 'exteriority,' they can be
deemed international relations. Agreements concluded in this framework bear incon-
testably the character of agreements under international law, at least in a certain mea-
sure"); Barberis, supra note 121, at 263 ("The Amman Accord of October 13, 1970...
shows clearly the international situation enjoyed by the PLO"); L'Accord, LE MONDE, Oct.
15, 1970, at 5 (summarizing text of Amman Accord).
137. G.A. Res. 50/58, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/58 (Mar. 7, 1996)
(preambular paragraph lists these agreements).
138. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, supra note
14, preamble.
139. G.A. Res. 3236, supra note 32.
140. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, entered into force March 23,
1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 ("All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of
that right they freely determine their political status"). See also Multilateral Treaties
Deposited with the Secretary-General, status as at December 31, 1991, at 149 (ratification
by Israel, Oct. 3, 1991).
141. Benvenisti, supra note 122, at 543-44 (referring to the Declaration preamble,
states "the Israeli recognition of the Palestinian people does constitute an implied recog-
nition of the right of that people to determine freely its political status").
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Second, the preamble recites that the parties "recognize their mutual
legitimate and political rights" and that they "strive to live in peaceful coex-
istence" and to "achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement
and historic reconciliation." 142 This wording reinforces a view of the PLO
as a party representing a people and that Israel was dealing with the PLO
with an understanding that the PLO was fulfilling such a role. The refer-
ence to political rights bespeaks a recognition of the Palestinians' right to
an independent political existence. 14 3 "Peaceful co-existence" describes a
state of relations one normally associates with two independent states.
14 4
The reference in the Declaration of Principles to "borders" as an issue
still to be resolved implies a state-to-state relationship between the two par-
ties, since a border separates states. 145 One analyst concludes from the
wording of the preamble of the Declaration of Principles that, "[i]t is hard
to escape the logical conclusion that by pleading mutuality, Israel has in
fact, albeit in a round-about way, implicitly recognized the right of the
Palestinians to a similar status, the occasional vehement protestations of
Israel government spokesman.., notwithstanding."
14 6
The Declaration of Principles and the agreements between Israel and
the PLO that followed appear to be premised on an understanding by each
side of an international status held by the other. The 1994 and 1995
interim agreements each include a species of savings clause providing that
the terms of those agreements should not be taken as a waiver of claims of
any nature. The provision, identical in the two agreements, reads: "Neither
Party shall be deemed, by virtue of having entered into this Agreement, to
have renounced or waived any of its existing rights, claims or positions."'147
This provision seems applicable to the PLO's claim, or position, that it rep-
resents the state of Palestine.
One analyst, however, finds that the texts of the Israel-PLO agreements
do not reflect an acknowledgement by Israel that it is dealing with a state
as its negotiating partner, and that, as a result, they are not treaties:
"Because the Palestinian side is so far definitively not treated as a state in
the negotiating process, and the PLO has accepted this diminished status,
the agreements reached' 48 are not treaties in a technical sense under inter-
142. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, supra note
14, preamble.
143. Blum, supra note 128, at 214 ("While [the Declaration of Principles]... scrupu-
lously avoids any reference to Palestinian self-determination and independence, its
wording leans heavily in that direction. The parties pledge mutual recognition of their
legitimate and political rights." (emphasis in original)).
144. Id. at 214 ("the references to peaceful co-existence etc. that appear in the DOP's
preamble characteristically describe relations between states.").
145. John V. Whitbeck, Now, Drop the Veil: The Palestinian State Exists, MIDDLE EAST
IN', Mar. 21, 1997, at 18.
146. Blum, supra note 128, at 214-15.
147. Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, supra note 17, art. 23(5);
Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, supra note 18, art. 31(6).
148. Declaration of Principles, supra note 14, Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the
Jericho Area, supra note 17, Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, supra
note 18.
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national law."14 9 This view attributes too great a significance to Israel's
official appraisal of the status of the PLO, and too little to the manner in
which it has dealt with the PLO in the negotiating process, as reflected in
the quoted terms of the three agreements.1 50
X. International Enforcement
The international community appears to regard the Israel-PLO agreements
as binding, presumably under international law. The U.N. Security Coun-
cil has twice called on the parties to implement their agreements. In 1994,
the Council urged "the implementation of the declaration of principles...
without delay,"' 5 1 a call evidently based on the assumption that the decla-
ration is more than aspirational. Again in 1996, at a time when implemen-
tation appeared to be in jeopardy, the Security Council called on the two
parties to resume negotiations. In the 1996 resolution, the Council
"urg[ed] the parties to fulfill their obligations, including the agreements
already reached."' 5 2 The Council thus referred to the agreements as
imposing "obligations" on the two parties.
The United Nations has been heavily involved in monitoring settle-
ments in various contexts in recent years, such as that in the Guatemalan
civil war, as related above. The Palestine problem is the longest-standing
territorial item on the U.N. agenda. From the General Assembly's recom-
mendation of a partition in 1947,15 3 through monitoring armistice agree-
ments in the 1950s,15 4 through a 1967 resolution that forms the basis of
current negotiations,' 5 5 through recognition of the PLO and promotion of
its aim of self-determination,' 5 6 the United Nations has often been at the
center of efforts to resolve the status of Palestine.
The Israel-PLO agreements were negotiated under the auspices of the
United States and Soviet Union (now the Russian Federation), and it was
anticipated that these two states would use their good offices to ensure
compliance by each party.' 5 7 The two states witnessed the signatures on
the Declaration of Principles and the 1995 Interim Agreement but did not
undertake any legal responsibility with respect to compliance by the
parties.' 5 8
149. Richard Falk, Some International Law Implications of the Oslo/Cairo Framework
for the PLO/Israeli Peace Process, 8 PALESTNE Y.B. INT'L L. 19, 29 (1994/95).
150. But see id. at 29, where, despite the author's statement just quoted, he finds that
by virtue of the manner in which the agreements have been treated by the international
community, the PLO has come to play "a state-like role in the process" and that this
makes the agreements "treaty-like for most purposes."
151. S.C. Res. 904, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3351st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/904 (1994),
reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 548 (1994).
152. S.C. Res. 1073, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1073 (1996).
153. G.A. Res. 181, U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/519 (1947).
154. JOHN QUIGLEY, PALESTINE AND ISRAEL: A CHALLENGE TO JUsTIcE 154 (1990).
155. S.C. Res. 242, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., at 8, U.N. Doc. S/INF/22/Rev.2 (1968).
156. G.A. Res. 3236, supra note 32.
157. See, e.g., infra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
158. Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, supra note 18, at 373.
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However, the territory in question is under Israel's belligerent occupa-
tion, a fact that gives rise to international responsibility for compliance
with basic norms.1 5 9 The states parties to the Geneva Civilians Conven-
tion, which includes most of the international community, and specifically
the United States and the Russian Federation, bear an obligation towards
the population of the territory to see that the occupier affords rights to
which the population is entitled under the law of belligerent occupa-
tion.160 Thus, these states are bound to act to prevent any ill treatment of
the population by Israel.
Moreover, with respect to the 1997 Hebron agreement, U.S. Secretary
of State Warren Christopher sent letters to both Israel and the PLO in
which he suggested that the United States would undertake some role in
ensuring compliance. 16 1 The U.S. letter to the PLO said that the United
States was committed to assist in the implementation of the Hebron
agreement.' 62
The European Union wrote the PLO a similar letter, in which it said
that the European Union would "use all its political and oral weight to
ensure that all the provisions in the agreements already reached will be
fully implemented on the basis of reciprocity by both Israeli and Palestin-
ian sides in a timely fashion."'16 3 This statement, with its reference to "the
agreements already reached," apparently applies not only to the Hebron
agreement but to the Declaration of Principles and the 1995 Interim Agree-
ment as well.
The exact content of what is being undertaken by the United States
and the European Union is not dear. However, both the United States and
the European Union by their letters indicate an intent to undertake an
enforcement role.
Conclusion
The situation of the Palestine Liberation Organization is neither that of a
party to a civil war nor that of a constituent part of a state. The PLO does
not seek a role within the state of Israel. Rather, it seeks an independent
life for Palestine, involving no constitutional relationship with Israel. Early
on, the question of the legal character of the interim agreements seemed
one of only passing interest, because it was anticipated that they would
soon be replaced by a final agreement. According to the Declaration of
Principles, talks were to begin in 1996 leading to a permanent arrange-
159. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra
note 131, art. I ("The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure
respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.").
160. Id.
161. "Secret" Letter to Arafat Says USA "Cdmmitted" to Implementing Peace Accord, BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, from HA'Ramz (Israeli daily, Tel Aviv, Jan. 31, 1997),
available in NEXIS, News Library.
162. Id.
163. David Makovsky, EU Wrote Letter of Hebron Assurance to Arafat, JEmusALEM PosT,
Feb. 10, 1997, at 1 (giving full text of letter).
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ment by 1999.164 However, soon after the accession of Benyamin Netany-
ahu to the post of prime minister in 1996, it appeared that this timetable
might not be met.
The Israel-PLO agreements are regarded by the two parties, and by the
international community, as binding. Each side charges the other with vio-
lations, thereby manifesting its view that the agreements are binding. Since
the agreements are not governed by the legal system of any state, the only
other body of law that could govern them is international law.
The Israel-PLO interim agreements are governed by international law
and, hence, are treaties. The PLO holds, in three ways, a status that makes
it capable of being a treaty partner. First, it represents the population of
territory under belligerent occupation, giving it a strong claim to present
sovereignty, despite the control exercised by Israel as a belligerent occu-
pant. Second, the PLO has a claim to being a state on the basis of its con-
trol of Gaza and parts of the West Bank. Third, the PLO represents the
Palestinian people, a people bearing a right to self-determination, and this
status makes it a subject of international law, even if not a state.
However one analyzes the PLO's status, the interim agreements may be
more difficult for either party to enforce in case of breach than with a treaty
between two states that exercise complete control of their territory.
Nonetheless, it would appear that the Israel-PLO agreements impose
binding obligations. The PLO possesses international subjectivity on any
one of three bases: (1) under the generally accepted criteria for being a
state, because it controls a population within a territory and has the capac-
ity to engage in treaty relations; (2) as the authority representing the popu-
lation of territory under belligerent occupation; (3) as a national liberation
movement representing a people entitled to self-determination.
Israel, in the instruments themselves, appears to be dealing with a
negotiating partner that has such international legal subjectivity. The
agreements contain firm commitments that import a sense of obligation, as
opposed to aspiration only. It is the apparent intent of the two parties that
their obligations are assumed under international law. Thus, on the basis
of the character of the parties and the content of the texts, the Israel-PLO
agreements would appear to be treaties.
Under whatever category the agreements are characterized, interna-
tional oversight is essential, both to ensure that the eventual terms of a final
settlement are fair, and to ensure compliance thereafter. It would be ironic
if, at this late date, the United Nations abandoned its efforts on the Pales-
tine question and allowed a settlement that could be dictated in line with
the power equation of the day. Unless the resulting final agreements
reflect the legitimate expectations of the parties, the Palestine problem
could remain on the United Nations agenda for another half century.
164. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, supra note
14, art. 5.
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